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Abstract:  Empirical evidence is presented from 24 UK based manufacturing companies, 
all offering a degree of product customisation, with most having a significant Engineer-to-
order (ETO) element.  The majority of the companies are SME’s, with the associated 
limited managerial resources.  The evidence addresses the issues of competitive advantage, 
including a detailed investigation of the strategic importance of repeat business.  It 
contrasts its results with those generally found in the literature and concludes that there are 
significant differences in the order winners/ qualifiers.  In particular, the evidence suggests 
that customisation is an order qualifier rather than an order winner; as it is increasingly 
unlikely that competitors will only offer a more standard product.  Thus alternative order 
winners are needed and often price becomes the most significant factor, rather than being a 
mere order qualifier.  Four different types of repeat business are then identified and the 
strategic importance of repeat business is discussed.  It is indicated that for some ETO 
companies, repeat business is perceived to be an important method to reduce costs and 
achieve business stability. However, a number of the other companies studied saw repeat 
business as infeasible and hence need to find other ways to reduce costs and improve 
company performance measures, such as lead times. Future research to extend this work 




business has changed, and how the companies have evolved in terms of the degree of 
customisation offered versus that offered by their competitors.  
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The increasing competitiveness in markets and the trend towards customers demanding 
more customisation of products highlights that understanding how Make-to-Order (MTO) 
and Engineer-to-Order (ETO) companies win orders is an important and significant area 
for research.  Such companies are usually organised as a jobbing process.  Authors such as 
Hill (2000) asserted that the choice of a jobbing process is associated with high quality, 
high cost products, for which the order winners include unique design ability and the order 
qualifiers include price.  However, research published in Amaro et al (1999) on mainly 
engineering companies in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK showed that for many 
jobbing companies the ability to customise is in fact an order qualifier, and that price is 
increasingly becoming an order winner.   Furthermore the research also indicated that as 
price and hence costs are becoming more important to jobbing companies, they are 
searching for ways to reduce their operating expenses.  This is particularly difficult in this 
sector as these firms are not always able to adopt the processing efficiencies of the mass 
production or even the mass customisation companies.  Typically, they operate on a MTO 
or ETO basis, producing a unique item for each customer.  The difference can be akin to 
the bespoke tailor, which makes any item in any material and any size, versus the mass 
customisation jeans manufacturer, which can make any size, but only jeans in a set range 
of colours and materials.   
It was suggested by Amaro et al (1999) that one way in which such ETO and MTO 
companies seek to reduce costs is by trying to attract repeat business from the same 
customers.  As most of the companies were SME’s, with limited management resources, 
such companies are trying to supply standard products and customised products with the 




operations strategists such as Skinner (1974, as discussed in Hayes (2002)) and his 
'manufacturing sins'.  
This paper presents the results of an empirical study of 24 ETO/MTO companies 
exploring the issue of competitive advantage and the importance of repeat business for 
companies of this type. Little has been written about the latter issue in the literature, indeed 
it is not an issue that is usually associated with ETO companies.  The research questions 
included: 
• When is pure customisation just a qualifier for companies offering purely 
customised products? Or, instead, when does it become an order-winner?  
• Do companies offering customised products favour "repeat business" as a means to 
reduce their business cycles and therefore increase their efficiency and profitability?  
Before the case study evidence is presented, the paper first presents a brief review of some 
of the key literature references in this area, and then describes the research methodology 
employed to collect the data.  This is followed by the presentation of the case study 
evidence, and discussion of the evidence, which seeks to answer the above two research 
questions.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An excellent, extensive, review of the manufacturing strategy literature has recently been 
presented by Dangayach and Deshmukh (2001).  They categorise the literature in this area 
into two basic types – process and content.  The latter is then broken down further into 
research which addresses: manufacturing capabilities; strategic choices; best practices; 
trans-national comparison; performance measurement and literature survey.  The research 
presented in this paper falls into the strategic choices category, as it seeks to determine the 
types of strategic choice that are successfully undertaken in modern ETO/MTO 
manufacturing companies.  Dangayach and Deshmukh (2001) point out that most of the 
manufacturing strategy literature is cross sectional, though there have been some recent 
attempts to look at specific sectors of industry such as machinery or metal working.  No 
recent articles that look at the ETO/MTO sector are identified apart from the paper by 




paper.  Thus this paper seeks to fill a gap in the literature by addressing strategic choices in 
a specific sector of industry, which has received little previous attention. 
   
The concept of order winners (OW) and order qualifiers (OQ), explained in depth 
by Hill (2000), is however questioned by other authors such as Spring and Boaden (1997).  
They suggest that this OW/OQ concept makes use of the trade-off model that was first 
introduced by Skinner (1969), but which is now a concept that is questioned by many other 
authors.  For example, Kathuria (2000) presents empirical evidence that contradicts the 
traditional trade-off model.  In contrast, Boyer and Lewis (2002) present empirical 
evidence that suggests that trade-offs remain.  Thus this is an issue that is still under 
discussion and more empirical evidence is needed to further the debate.  This paper further 
explores the trade-off concept within the context of the OW/OQ concept and asks whether 
the latter leads to meaningful managerial implications. 
Other publications relevant to the research presented here include a literature 
review on the ‘resource based view’ of competition by Gagnon (1999) and a recent paper 
on customisation by Spring and Dalrymple (2000).  The former stresses the importance of 
ensuring that operations capabilities are used to drive the strategic planning of companies, 
rather than allowing a market-based lead which assumes a completely adjustable 
manufacturing function.  The latter uses four case studies along with a thorough literature 
review on the topic of customisation to build a novel model of the customisation process. 
This paper builds on research of this type by further exploring the customisation capability 
to assess the type of competitive advantage that it brings. 
 
Taxonomies of Non Make-to-Stock companies 
Before proceeding further, it is also necessary to clarify the definition of the ETO/MTO 
sector, as used in this paper.  Amaro et al (1999) presented a new taxonomy for non Make-
to-stock companies with 17 different categories, explaining why it was felt to be necessary 
to develop a new system.  In this paper, an abridged version of that taxonomy is used to 
classify the types of companies that are studied.  This decision was taken in an attempt to 
make this paper self-explanatory without the need to repeat a significant part of the 




characteristics of the companies that are relevant to competitive advantage and the nature 
of repeat business discussed in the following sections. Two key aspects of the original 
taxonomy used here are: 
• The titles ETO, MTO and ATO (Assemble-to-order), where these titles indicate 
the amount of work carried out after the order has been placed.  For ETO, the 
design, manufacture and assembly of the product takes place after the order is 
confirmed.  For MTO, the basic design is already in place, and though there may 
be some modifications to the design, most of the work after the order is confirmed 
is in the manufacture and assembly of the product.  Note that in this case, the 
design can be supplied by the customer or by the MTO company.  In the ATO 
sector, it is just the assembly of the components that is carried out after receipt of a 
definite order, the components are produced to stock in advance. 
• The nature of the customisation carried out by the company. The first three 
categories are as defined by Mintzberg (1988). Firstly, there is pure (p) 
customisation, which entails producing a new design.  Secondly there is tailored 
(ta) customisation, which entails the modification of an existing design.  Thirdly, 
there is standardised (stan) customisation, where the customer can pick from a set 
of design options.  In addition, a fourth category is used, which is described as 
‘none’. It is needed for those MTO and ATO companies that choose to await a 
customer order, even though they produce a standard product with no 
customisation options.  This is in contrast to customisation companies that cannot 
complete ahead of the customer order as no two orders are alike. 
Thus the following categories are used:  
ETO (p),  
MTO (ta), MTO (stan), MTO (none),  
ATO (stan), ATO (none) 
In addition, it has been postulated that a  firm can be a ‘Repeat Business Customiser’ 
(RBC), negotiating business as a series of orders by contract, or a ‘Versatile Manufacturing 
Company’ (VMC), negotiating each order separately.  These definitions are discussed in 
detail in Amaro et al (1999), and explored further as part of the evidence on repeat 





The data was collected from the 24 companies via semi-structured interviews.   All of the 
companies were based in the North West of England and the sample is therefore a 
convenience sample.   This methodology was chosen as issues of competitive advantage 
are complex and it was felt that a postal survey would not be well answered.  In addition, 
the larger postal survey is generally better for discovering ‘what’ is happening rather than 
‘why’.  It is important to try to understand ‘why’ so that the relevance to other companies 
can be determined clearly. Thus rich data was collected from which it would be possible to 
derive some managerial implications. 
The interviews were structured via a questionnaire, but plenty of opportunity was 
given for interviewees to add other relevant information.  Where possible, several 
managers were interviewed, including the Managing Director, the Sales Manager and the 
Operations Manager.  Where this was not possible, bias introduced by the perspective 
given was carefully considered in analysing the data.  Summaries of each interview were 
typed up and sent to the interviewee with any outstanding questions marked.  This was 
followed up by a telephone query to clear up any such outstanding issues.  Good feedback 
of this type was received from most, though not all of the companies involved.   Thus, the 
data analysed is as accurate as was possible.   
Part of the questionnaire asked the interviewee to score Order Winners and Order 
Qualifiers.  However, this data did not provide any useful analysis.  The main reason for 
this was that the comments given by the interviewee often did not correlate well to the 
scores that they had given.  When asked during the feedback about the contradictions, they 
were unable to resolve them, confirming a comment made by previous authors such as 
Spring and Boaden (1997) that company managers find the concept of OW and OQ hard to 
grasp.  Therefore, the analysis below is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. 
A pilot study was carried out in one company, before the research was carried out 
in earnest.  As this did not lead to any issues that could not be resolved through a follow up 
telephone call, the data for this company is as complete as for the other companies.  





THE CASE STUDY DATA 
The characteristics of the 24 companies studied are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below.  
Table 1 describes the company in terms of turnover and number of employees in1996, as 
this is the year in which the data collection commenced.    It is noted that the majority of 
companies could be described as SME’s, with 18 out of the 24 having a workforce of less 
that 150 employees and an annual turnover of less than £24million (Anonymous European 
definition of an SME ,1996).  Table 1 also describes the main business area, where this can 
be a manufacturing capability such as precision sheet metal components (e.g. companies B 
and C), or more commonly a type of product such as doors, windows or a type of industrial 
machinery.  In all the latter cases, there is a degree of customisation involved in the 
manufacture, none of the companies studied produced entirely standard products.  In fact, 
data was initially collected from 28 companies, and four were removed from the study as 
they did not have a significant degree of customisation in their business. 
 
[Take in Table 1] 
 
Table 2 categorises the companies using the abridged taxonomy described in the previous 
main section of this paper.  In the second column, the main business type is given, this 
refers to the type of business which is most common.  In the third column, any other 
business type is also listed.  This shows that 15 out of the 24 companies have some degree 
of ETO (p) activity, even though it is only the main business line for 7 of those 15 
companies.  Note that many of these companies operate in several markets at once, either 
with the same product that can be customised or standard, or by supplying several types of 
product.  The fourth column seeks to identify the % of ETO activity within the business.  It 
is noted that this is not a static figure and many companies found it difficult to answer this 
question.  However, the information provides an indication, which is sufficient for 
comparison purposes.  Finally, the fifth column indicates whether the company operates as 
an RBC or a VMC firm.   
[Take in Table 2] 
 
Table 3 indicates which companies compete against competitors which offer the same level 




customisation and those who have a range of competitors, some offering less customisation 
and some offering the same.  Note that none of the companies studied had competitors 
offering more customisation.  This factor was expected to be significant in terms of 
determining competitive advantage as discussed in the following section. 
 
[Take in Table 3] 
 
DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDY EVIDENCE 
The qualitative data is discussed in three sections:  
• competitive advantage including the issues relevant to OW and OQ;  
• repeat business and  
• additional insights. 
 
Competitive Advantage 
Many of those interviewed began by declaring an overwhelming sense that everything is 
important, including price, design ability, delivery speed, delivery reliability, quality, 
flexibility and customisation.  Hence, this would lead to the conclusion that no competitive 
priority can be neglected and modern manufacturing firms cannot afford to adopt the trade-
off stance.   However, when questioned more deeply, patterns emerged, relating to the type 
of competition and the degree of customisation that the firm offered. 
Firstly, it is noted that of the seven companies, A-G, for whom ETO (p) is the main 
line of business, 5 had competitors offering the same degree of customisation, whilst the 
other 2 had competitors with the same or lesser degrees of customisation.  For these 
companies, customisation does not figure as a key order winner, in fact in some cases, such 
as company E, customisation is not even considered as an OQ.  Hence, all of these 
companies support the theory that where competitors offer similar levels of customisation, 
other OW factors must be found.  Companies A, D, F and G state that price is a key order 
winner.  For example, the Operations Manager in company G stated that: “at the end of the 
day, price is the most important thing when contracts are fought for”, thus the company 
“will invariably win orders on a price basis”.  Company A noted that though price is a key 




price is less important and such clients may then try to squeeze the company on price 
through negotiation.  Similarly, company F felt that price and customer relationships were 
key to winning business.  If a long-lasting and trust based relationship exists, then “if the 
company happens to offer a higher price, it might be offered the option to adjust its price to 
the competition and so win the job”.  It was also noted that the buyer is not only interested 
in the cost of the initial purchase.  If the company can offer a unique technical solution that 
can reduce the long term running cost of the equipment, then this may also be the OW.  
This suggests that design ability is then important, but in a manner that is linked to the long 
term cost of the solution for the customer.  
Companies B and C both claimed that their key OW was the ability to offer the 
whole package to the client: to take “an original customer’s requirement and to turn it into 
a final finished product”.  In fact company C claimed that the OW had already evolved 
beyond price and that as companies were now competitive on this factor, yet other newer 
competitive advantages had to be found. 
Company E saw price as being an important OW, but only as part of an overall 
package, in which the company scored highly on price, quality and service.  It was felt that 
its advantage was  “being good at all these things” consistently.  However, it was also 
stated that technical ability was an important competitive advantage and the company was 
not clear about which factor was most important. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that the world of the pure customiser is very 
competitive and that customisation alone is not sufficient to win business.  Instead, other 
factors are now becoming important, and price is often one of the key issues. 
For most of the remaining companies for which the competitors offered the same 
level of customisation, the type of customisation on offer is either MTO (stan) or ATO 
(stan).  These companies are O, Q, S, T, W, X.  For these companies, it is more difficult to 
identify a pattern in the OWs and OQs that were claimed by those interviewed.  However, 
again none of them suggested that customisation was an OW.  Instead, companies O and X 
included price, with the former also suggesting that delivery speed and reliability are 
important for their MTO (stan) business, but less so for the MTO (ta) and ETO (p) sector. 
Company X is smaller than its competitors and is therefore able to compete on price for 




could undercut them on price if they did want this business in the future.  The company 
also has two other key advantages: it currently offers larger mixers than the other 
manufacturers and smaller customers prefer to work with smaller companies as they feel 
that they will receive a higher quality service.  Company Q claimed that the long term 
relationship with the client was key. Company T suggested that quality and service are 
more important, though the company has to be competitive and provide value for money.  
For company W, the design was seen to be key, as it has the highest speed machinery and 
the greatest range of pattern attachments.  However, they acknowledged that smaller 
companies sometimes try to enter the market and undercut on price, but they rarely 
succeed as they do not have the efficiency of the larger organisation.  This company 
appeared to have a degree of business confidence based on operating in a small market, 
with few clients and few competitors, in which it has a good reputation at present. 
Interestingly, company S supported the claim of company B, that the OW and OQ 
are changing over time, or at least becoming more stringent.  All its competitors are good 
on price and quality now, so it needs to find a new way to compete.  Hence important 
factors include flexibility in terms of capacity adjustment or good personal relationships 
with clients. 
For the MTO (ta) companies, two had a competitor offering the same degree of 
customisation, companies I and J.  Of the remaining companies in this sector, K and L had 
competitors offering the same or lesser degrees of customisation, whilst companies H and 
M had competitors offering less customisation.  Here a difference in the way they compete 
can be clearly attributed to the nature of their competitors.  Company L claimed that there 
is a need to offer something which your competitors do not offer.  So customisation is 
offered where their competitors do not offer this, or technical superiority is offered where 
they are competing against a similar level of customisation.  For company M, 
customisation is the clear OW for the MTO (ta) part of their business.  Company H also 
sees their expertise as the main way to win orders.  They offer a consultancy service which 
advices the client on the best type of door, and so it is their design capability which is 
particularly pertinent.  They aim to offer competitive though not necessarily the cheapest 
prices, thus suggesting that price remains an OQ.   These conclusions contrast with 




reputation, delivery reliability (not speed), and after-sales service.  For I price is more 
important as an OW than an OQ, but it never loses business on the basis of price, as it is 
always willing to adjust prices (though never at a loss).   
For company K, competitive advantage still depends on the nature of the 
competitors, but it is now the size of the competitor as well as the degree of customisation 
that is important.  If competing with a company of similar size, then it can be that price is a 
key OW.  However, if the competitor is larger, then it is necessary to find an alternative 
competitive edge such as by offering more customisation or flexibility.  Thus they perceive 
that they can charge a premium for true ‘specials’, as this is something that their 
competitors do not offer. As discussed above for company A, company K also felt that the 
sophistication of the client is important, with less sophisticated clients being more 
interested in price. 
The remaining companies with competitors offering the same or lesser degrees of 
customisation are companies P and U, offering mostly MTO (stan) and ATO (stan) 
respectively.  Company P acknowledged that it is difficult to keep a steady flow of work, 
hence there is a tendency to cut prices when they really want an order.  In general, 
however, price is important for their MTO (stan) market, but less so for their more 
customised business.  Here it is the technological solutions that matter more, and it is here 
that the competitors offer lower levels of customisation. For company U, price is not seen 
to be an OW, instead quality and design capabilities are key.  This is a small company, 
winning more small projects than large ones as does not have the economy of scale 
necessary to win large orders.  So again company size is important. 
The remaining companies with competitors offering less customisation are 
companies N, R and V.  All of these companies stated that customisation is an OW, along 
with other factors such as flexibility, design and after sales service.   
Of course, some companies also felt that the winning of orders was not necessarily 
based on good decision criteria.  For example, companies G and I both pointed out that 
sometimes “national prejudice” is a factor that affects decision makers in the client 
organisation, with some buyers for company G biased towards German products, whilst 




 Repeat Business 
As discussed in the earlier literature review section, the term ‘Repeat Business Customiser’ 
(RBC) was introduced by Amaro et al (1999) to refer to companies which negotiate 
business as a series of orders by contract.  This was introduced alongside the term Versatile 
Manufacturing Company (VMC), which referred to those companies that negotiate each 
order separately.  Thus in the RBC case the nature of the repeat business was to attain a 
series of orders for the same customer for the same product.   However, during the analysis 
of the empirical data for this study, it became apparent that repeat business was also an 
important strategic objective in several of the companies categorised as VMC’s.   In this 
case, the nature of the repeat business could be one or more of the following three types: 
• the repeat sale of a product initially designed for one customer, but then also sold to 
one or more other customers.  If this type of repeat occurs on several occasions, then 
the company could be in the business of evolving its product lines from highly 
customised products to much more standard products. 
• repeat business for the same customer, but for a different product. Thus the company is 
benefiting from long term relationships from customers, which can lead to future 
orders, albeit with a fresh need to design and manufacture the product. 
• repeat business for the same product for the same customer.  This may seem similar to 
the RBC case, but here the number of similar orders is very small, and each product is 
generally ordered separately. 
Figure 1 summarises these categories of repeat business, giving the labels R, V1, V2 and 
V3 Type, for ease of reference throughout this section.  Table 4 then indicates the type of 
repeat business in which each company is involved.  Note that not all VMC’s are included 
in Table 4, as it was noted that some of these companies indicated that they do not 
experience any repeat business at all at present.  In addition, the discussion focuses on 
repeat business of customised products, particularly ETO(p).  Thus, if the repeat business 
only relates to products categorised as MTO or ATO,  then these companies are excluded 
from the discussion below. The following paragraphs describe the company evidence for 




when it is felt to be realistic / desirable to increase levels of repeat business rather than 
sticking to the one-off highly customised production.  
 
[Take in Figure 1] 
[Take in Table 4] 
 
Table 5 summarises the percentage of repeat business for the ETO(p) type of 
customisation, also indicating preference towards increasing this percentage and the impact 
that repeat business is perceived to have upon manufacturing lead times and profitability.  
As indicated earlier in Table 2, companies B, C, D and E are all RBC companies, the first 
three having 100% ETO(p) activity, whilst E has 90%.  In each case, they are in the 
business of producing components for a larger manufacturer, with large contracts 
negotiated as a series of orders over a long period.  Hence they all exhibit clear ‘R’ type 
repeat business. The case study evidence for companies B, C, D and E suggests that the 
repeat business nature of their work is of strategic importance.  For company B, this is 
particularly pertinent as it is only for repeat orders that they typically make a profit.  For 
new orders, it was stated that they only break even with a 0% profit margin as it was 
suggested that the aim at this stage is to win a longer-term contract.  Despite the lack of 
profitability, the company stresses the need for new orders for new products, stating that 
ideally the company wants to attract at least one new customer per year, with at least one 
new product per month.  The MD referred to the “natural wastage of customers”, claiming 
that “any company needs to get new businesses (new customers/ new products) each year 
otherwise it will die”.    
[Take in Table 5] 
 
In contrast to company B, the Managing Director of company C stressed the need 
for repeat business rather than the need for new business.  He stated that when the 
objective is to grow the operations, there must be a balance between new business and 
repeat business.  In addition, he stressed that the bigger the company gets, the more it 
needs consistency, which only comes from repeat business.  The strategic objective here is 




orders as needed to develop new long term contracts, not to produce one-off batches unless 
this was seen as a special requirement for an existing customer. The reason for stressing 
the importance of repeat business in this case was due to the efficiency gains achieved. In 
this case, the customers provide a forecast of their requirements for the next 2/3 months.  
Even though this is subject to change, these forecasts enable the company to make batches 
of products and to carry some stocks of raw materials or products (either at the final or part 
processed stage). Thus they are able to supply their customers on a JIT basis, assisting 
customers in minimising their inventories.   
 Similarly company D stated the advantage of repeat business from a company 
efficiency point of view.  For example, long-term contracts with one client can lead to the 
purchase of specialised tooling.  This can be problematic when making the initial 
investment for a small company, but has long-term benefits.  As for company B, a 
significant proportion of new business is felt to be of strategic importance especially for 
expansion prospects.  Thus the stated aim to decrease the percentage of repeat business to a 
slightly lower value than the stated 80%.   Thus all three of companies B, C and D require 
a balance of new and repeat business, the former providing long term stability whilst the 
latter provides company efficiency gains and prospects for growth.  Although the preferred 
percentage of each type of business varies, all of them state a desire for a majority of repeat 
business, ranging from 70 – 90%. 
 For company E, the costs of tooling are such that it cannot make anything on a one-
off, as it is too expensive to invest in the tooling.  Therefore all of its ETO (p) business is 
for large volumes on an RBC basis for a twelve month period or more.  Set-up times can 
be particularly problematic here (often taking 3 to 5 days), and hence the levels of repeat 
business are perceived to be essential to enable the company to make products in batches 
and stock items to meet orders.  Thus this company provides an extreme example of an ‘R’ 
type RBC company, for which only repeat business is perceived to be viable. 
 From Table 5, it can be seen that there is not a clear pattern amongst companies B 
to E in terms of the lead time or profitability differences between repeat orders and new 
orders.  Company B was the only one of theses companies that quoted a reduced lead time 




repeat business for these companies, which do not always include lead time or cost 
reduction.   
For companies F, J, N, O, P and U, with relatively low levels of repeat ETO(p) 
business, a desire was expressed to see an increase in this aspect of their work, either by 
attracting more business from the same customer (V2 Type) or by converting some one-off 
special products into products that can be sold in a tailored customisation or standardised 
customisation manner to future clients (V1 Type).  For example, company F, with the use 
of CAD design, is able to produce modified designs very quickly, thus reducing lead times 
and costs.  The reduction in costs can either be converted into increased profits or into a 
lower price for the customer to improve the chance of winning the order.  Usually a 
compromise is reached, leading to slightly more profitable repeat orders.   Similarly, 
company J saw advantages in reduced costs through repeat business.  However, for 
company J, when selling the same machine more than once there is often such a large time 
gap between the two orders that it is necessary to upgrade the machine design.  Hence it 
may be regarded as a new product rather than a repeat from a design and cost point of 
view.  For company O, the reasons for wanting more repeats were due to increased profits 
and lower levels of engineering works.  However, in this case the company Managing 
Director felt that it was unlikely to be feasible to increase the percentage of repeats above 
the 15% quoted.   Thus for all three of these companies, producing capital goods, the 
strategic importance of repeat business is due to the increased ability to control lead times 
and the improved profitability. 
In contrast, the Managing Director of company N claimed that it is difficult to 
estimate the difference in profit between new and repeat orders, but that profits are 
possibly slightly higher for the new orders. Despite this, a desire was expressed to develop 
a standard range of products from customer specific orders, increasing the level of repeats 
to a much higher percentage than the 10% quoted.  The reasons given are however still 
cost related, as design and engineering employees are seen as overhead costs.  The 
engineering design of a new product is clearly much higher than for a repeat order, and 
hence higher levels of repeats will lead to a bigger turnover to absorb the same overheads, 
hence reducing the cost burden in relative terms.  However, the desire to increase the level 




combining the volume and the specials business.  Thus consideration is being given to the 
development of a separate workshop for the repeat volume part of the business.  At 
present, customised production gets priority because these contracts are perceived to be of 
higher importance to the company. 
Similarly the sales manager of company P stated that repeat orders do not 
necessarily lead to a higher profit. Instead, the main advantage is that for a repeat order 
“the risk is taken out of the job”.  For new jobs, the estimation process has a high risk as 
the company is not so sure about the costs as the machine may prove to be more difficult to 
build than expected.  Hence the company is more able to control costs with repeat orders, 
leading to greater control of other aspects of the management process including lead times. 
For companies A and G, the nature of the capital goods they supply is such that 
repeat business is very unlikely as the equipment lasts for many years and hence a 
customer would only purchase another if they expand their operation.  However, for 
company A, there are occasions when a client modifies its plant or wants to install some 
new machinery.  Thus the company values repeat business from the same customer, but for 
different products (V3 Type).  The Managing Director stressed: “you still have to sell to 
them, to keep in touch with them”.  It is no good just expecting them to come back for the 
next order, clients are visited regularly to ensure that company A is considered for future 
orders.  However, this type of repeat business does not lead to any cost or lead time 
savings.  Thus, for both company A and company G, other means to drive down costs must 
be found.  Similar issues arise for company I, for the ETO(p) part of the business, giving 
further evidence of the possibility and perceived importance of ‘V3’ Type repeat business.    
However, much of the business for company I is for MTO production with standard 
components and hence costs are brought down in the usual way for manufacturing a 
standard product. 
For the remaining VMC companies with an element of ETO(p), the issue of repeat 
business has a much lower strategic priority.  For example, for company H, there are very 
few repeats and the company has no intention of changing this.  The perception of the 
Marketing & Sales Director is that the company “sells its expertise, which is the one 
unique thing the company has and that no other door manufacturer has”.  It was 




door market.  However, this was seen as a separate venture, which could lead to the setting 
up of a second company.  There was a strong perception that mixing the production of 
standard and special doors was not a good idea and that it is better to commit resources to 
the production of special doors for major projects.  Similarly, the Sales Manager of 
company K stressed that the company’s aim is to take advantage of the niche market 
offered by making special machines. The number of competitors in this market is very 
small, and a recent contract was quoted in which there were no competitors for the order. 
In this case, the price can be high to offset the level of risk involved in determining the 
method of manufacture etc.  In this ETO (p) market, there is little scope for repeat 
business, but this is a situation, which the company is not trying to change.   Although only 
two companies expressed this less favourable attitude to the strategic importance to repeat 
business, this evidence demonstrates that some companies still aim to sustain long-term 
viability depending heavily on one-off or small batch production, despite the risks involved 
when determining the prices to quote for products that have never been produced before. 
 
Other Insights 
The case study evidence also provides some very tentative evidence of the movement of 
companies along the line of the taxonomy presented in the earlier literature review section.  
For example, company H has experienced growth by developing a separate standard doors 
business, which is perceived to have a very different strategic position to its specials 
business.  Company R has a policy of making one-offs into standards, relying often on its 
customers to come up with the ideas for new product designs.  Company U has moved in 
the opposite direction, having initially offered a standard product, they are now involved in 
customisation.  In this case, it was suggested that the onset of mass customisation has 
killed the market for the more standard product.   
 In addition, for one of the companies studied, the importance of competitor analysis 
was seen to be key to their success.  In particular, this company, K, indicated that 
personnel went as far as getting real quotes from its competitors and this lead to a better 





 Finally, the evidence suggested that several companies operate in more than more 
market at once.  For example, company M offers both standards and specials and it was 
suggested that it is strategically important to keep a foot in both markets. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The first important conclusion from this empirical study confirms the importance of 
competing on a price basis when tendering for incoming orders, and that being able to offer 
unique design ability is often just an order qualifier. This suggests a change in the 
manufacturing environment, whereby as more and more companies gain the ability to 
customise goods efficiently, the customer is able to choose between a group of ETO 
companies when asking for bids.  This in turn means that customers then make the final 
choice on other factors, which may include delivery speed and reliability, but as companies 
become more competitive on these issues too, then price also becomes a more important 
factor in determining the outcome of the competitive bidding process. Thus this research 
confirms the notion that price is increasingly becoming an order winner for jobbing 
companies as well as for the producers of more standard products. 
The second important conclusion is that for many of the ETO SME’s studied, some 
aspect of repeat business is essential to their survival. Whilst it is not surprising that they 
find this to be a good means of reducing operating expenses, it is perhaps surprising that 
they are able to achieve this aim in the ETO environment.  The types of repeat business 
vary from a long term contract supplying the same product to the same customer to repeats 
of one product then supplied to another to sporadic repeat business for a different product 
to a previous client.  Even companies categorised as Versatile Manufacturing Companies 
(VMC) pursue long term customer relationships  in order to ensure as much repeat 
business as possible, even if this is for a unique product each time.  
From a managerial implications perspective, the research reinforces the need to 
understand competitors as well as customers.  Order winning and order qualifying criteria 
are as much a result of the competitor actions as of the particular market segment that the 
company is aiming to attract.  The results also confirm that there remain a number of 




less, and these companies need to seek other ways to reduce their operating costs than 
those that are available to the mass production and mass customisation industry.   
Future research could include a larger survey to further confirm these results and 
the size of each of these sectors of industry with varying degrees of repeat business, this 
may be important for the software market in establishing a need for software other than the 
ERP based systems currently widely available.  For example, workload control is designed 
for companies with a large VMC element and research is ongoing to develop this into a 
commercially viable alternative (see for example Stevenson et al, 2005).  In addition, this 
study could be extended into a longitudinal study to investigate whether and how order 
winners/ qualifiers have evolved since the initial data collection and whether companies 
have evolved in terms of the degree of customisation they offer or the percentage of repeat 
business in their portfolio. 
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Company Turnover No. of  Main business area 
 Millions employees  
 £     
A 4.5 70  Boiler Plants 
B 3.5 86  Precision sheet metal components. 
C  5.2 130  Precision sheet metal components. 
D 6.0 102  Crankshafts e.g. for medium / large diesel engines 
E 19.5 230  Pressed components  
F 8.5 100  Bulk conveying / handling systems 
G 125.0 500  Roof support and chain conveyors for coal mines 
H 4.5 50  Lift doors and specialist industrial doors  
I 15.0 175  CNC tube bending machines and machine tools 
J 10.0 200  Textile machinery 
K 6.3 67  Industrial machines for processing polyurethane foam 
L  20.0 257  Switchgears and reclosers. 
M 4.5 100  Doors: specialised fire resistant, sound proof etc 
N 3.0 48  Industrial machinery for personal hygiene products 
O 16.0 147  Industrial machinery: e.g. for wallpaper coverings  
P 2.0 15  Industrial Dryers etc 
Q 13.8 64  Metal, steel and aluminium roofs and walls. 
R 5.0 100  Farm equipment, such as feeding systems, silos etc  
S 8.7 105  Forks for fork lift trucks 
T 6.0 84  Calender* bowl with 100 different covering materials 
U 3.0 56  Windows: specialises in steel frames 
V 120.0 590  Industrial machinery: e.g. loaders and mini escalators 
W 20.0 300  Tufting machines for carpet industry 
X 3.7 28  Site dumpers for using on construction site; concrete mixers
 
Table 1 – Case study company characteristics 
 












       
A ETO (p)   100% VMC
B ETO (p)   100% RBC
C ETO (p)   100% RBC
D ETO (p)   100% RBC
E ETO (p)  MTO (none) 90% RBC
F ETO (p)  MTO (ta) 70% VMC
G ETO (p) & MTO (ta)   50% VMC
H MTO (ta) ETO (p)  45% VMC
I MTO (ta) ETO (p), MTO (stan)   15/20% VMC
J MTO (ta) ETO (p) 15% VMC
K MTO (ta) ETO (p), MTO (stan)   10% VMC
L MTO (ta)   0% VMC
M MTO (ta) MTO (none) 0% VMC/RBC
N MTO (stan) ETO (p), MTO1 (ta) 25% VMC
O MTO (stan) ETO (p) MTO (ta)  16% VMC/RBC
P MTO (stan) ETO (p), MTO (ta & none) > 0% VMC
Q MTO (stan)   0% VMC
R MTO (stan)   0% VMC
S MTO (stan) MTO (none) 0% RBC
T MTO (stan) MTO (ta) 0% VMC/RBC
U ATO (stan) ETO (p), MTO (ta) 5% VMC
V ATO (stan)   0% VMC
W ATO (stan) MTO (ta) 0% VMC/RBC
X ATO (stan)   0% VMC
 
Table 2 – Case study companies and the degree of ETO activity 
 
 
Degree of customisation  
Of competitors Companies 
  
same  A, C, D, E, G, I, J, O, Q, S, T, W, X 
Less H, M, N, R, V 
same or less B, F, K, L, P, U 










Type of repeat Business Relevant Companies  
R  Type B, C, D, E 
V1 Type F, J, O, N 
V2 Type F, J, O, N, P, U 
V3 Type A, G, I  
 




Differences between New Orders (NO)  
and Repeat Orders (RO) 
Company  
% of Repeat Orders in the turnover
 
 
Preference for more Repeat Orders




A     None More N/A N/A
B 80-90%                      
 (20-25% same product;  
60-65% modifications) 
Same NO: 6 wks (or longer)            
RO: 4wks 
NO: at best 0%                
RO: about 30% 
C 50% More RO can be forecast & 
scheduled more easily 
Same 
D    80% Less Same Same
E     100% Same N/A N/A
F Small % More RO is 20% shorter than NO RO is 3-5% more profitable than 
NO 
G     0% More N/A N/A
H Small % Same Both 6-8 wks Same 
I     0% More N/A N/A
J Small, varied % More NO: 8 wks                         
RO: 4-6 wks 
RO is more profitable 
K      0% Same N/A N/A
N 10% More RO: about half as long as 
NO 
Difficult to measure, possibly 
higher for  NO 
O 15% More NO: 30-36 wks                   
RO: 20-25wks 
RO is 20% more profitable than 
NO  
P     Small % More NO>RO RO is not necessarily more 
profitable 
U 10% More RO is normally 2 wks less RO reduces 5% of the costs 
 
Table 5: Repeat Business issues for companies with ETO(p) customisation 
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